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OPINION* 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 In December 2007, a federal court jury found Pedro Vazquez guilty on two 
criminal counts:  conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 
50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and distributing 
and possessing with the intent to distribute (PWID) 50 grams or more of cocaine 
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).  Prior to trial, an enhanced 
penalty information had informed Vazquez that he would be subject to a 
mandatory minimum of 20 years imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a).  After 
trial, the presentence investigation report (PSR) noted that Vazquez had three 
purported New Jersey PWID convictions: (1) a PWID conviction with a 364-day 
sentence (364 conviction); (2) a PWID conviction with a five-year sentence, which 
was the basis for the enhanced penalty information; and (3) a PWID conviction 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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with a five-year sentence that was initiated by Accusation 142-97 (Accusation 
conviction or Accusation).  The PSR calculated a 324 to 405-month sentencing 
guideline range.  This range was increased to 360 months to life imprisonment 
based on a conclusion that two of Vazquez’s prior convictions qualified as 
controlled substance offenses for purposes of the career offender enhancement 
under U.S. Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.1.  Although the PSR did not 
specify which convictions were the predicate for the enhancement, it is apparent 
now that it was the PWID with the five-year sentence and the Accusation 
conviction.  There was no objection at sentencing to the career offender 
enhancement.  The District Court sentenced Vazquez to 360 months’ imprisonment 
on both counts to run concurrently. 
 Vazquez’s direct appeal was unsuccessful.  See United States v. Vazquez, 
449 F. App’x 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2011).  In November 2012, Vazquez filed a timely 
pro se motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which alleged that his trial and 
appellate counsel were ineffective because they failed to challenge his 
classification as a career offender.  Vazquez asserted for the first time that his 
counsel should have objected to the enhancement because the Accusation 
conviction did not constitute a controlled substance offense for purposes of 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  In support of that assertion, Vazquez provided the judgment for 
the Accusation, which showed that the PSR had erroneously described a conviction 
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for simple possession of a controlled substance as PWID.  Vazquez correctly noted 
that in Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188 (2006) (per curiam), the Supreme 
Court held that simple possession cannot serve as a predicate “controlled substance 
offense” for career offender purposes.   
 This challenge to the Accusation conviction was a surprise to the 
government.  After more than a year, in February 2014, the government conceded 
that Vazquez was correct that “one of the predicate offenses that designated him a 
career offender . . . was incorrectly identified as a felony drug distribution offense, 
when it was actually a felony drug possession offense.”  A146.  The District Court 
granted a request by the government for additional time to determine if any of 
Vazquez’s other convictions might qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of 
maintaining his career offender status, which in the government’s view would 
render the § 2255 petition moot.  The government’s investigation unearthed a 
probation violation of the 364 conviction, for which Vazquez received a three year 
sentence. Because no judgment had been entered for this probation violation, it had 
not been listed in the PSR.  After the New Jersey state court system was advised 
that a judgment had not been issued on the probation violation, the New Jersey 
Criminal Division issued a nunc pro tunc judgment sentencing Vazquez to three 
years on the probation violation.  On the heels of the nunc pro tunc judgment, the 
government filed its opposition to Vazquez’s § 2255, conceding the errant 
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characterization of the Accusation conviction in the PSR, but arguing that Vazquez 
could not show the prejudice needed to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim.  
According to the government, Vazquez would still qualify as a career offender 
because the 364 conviction, which had not been counted as a predicate offense 
initially because it was not imposed within ten years of Vazquez’s instant offense, 
could now be counted as a controlled substance offense.  The 364 conviction could 
be considered because the guidelines required adding the three year sentence on 
the probation violation to the original term of imprisonment, which resulted in the 
total sentence falling within the applicable time period.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(e) 
& (k), 4B1.2(b). 
 Vazquez vigorously opposed consideration of this nunc pro tunc judgment.  
He argued that the government should be limited to a resentencing proceeding 
based on the original record.  The District Court was not persuaded and denied 
Vazquez’s § 2255 petition.  The Court reasoned that this new information 
regarding Vazquez’s criminal history would have been admissible at the initial 
proceeding and therefore Vazquez would have been appropriately designated as a 
career offender.  Because Vazquez would thus have qualified as a career offender, 
the Court concluded that Vazquez could not show that he had been prejudiced by 
counsel’s failure to object to the career offender enhancement.  The Court, 
therefore, denied his ineffectiveness claim.  Vazquez filed a timely appeal, 
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challenging the District Court’s decision to permit the introduction of new 
evidence at a resentencing and the conclusion that he had failed to show prejudice.†  
 We review a District Court’s decision “permitting further development of 
the record” at resentencing for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Dickler, 64 
F.3d 818, 831 (3d Cir. 1995).  In Dickler, we agreed with several of our sister 
circuits “that, where the government has the burden of production and persuasion 
as it does on issues like enhancement . . . , its case should ordinarily have to stand 
or fall on the record it makes the first time around.  It should not normally be 
afforded ‘a second bite at the apple.’”  Id. at 832 (quoting United States v. Leonzo, 
50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and citing United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 
542, 553-54 (4th Cir. 1994)).  Yet we pointed out that “we perceive no 
constitutional or statutory impediment to the district court’s providing the 
government with an additional opportunity to present evidence on remand if it has 
tendered a persuasive reason why fairness so requires.”  Id. (citing cases).  And, we 
noted that “[i]f the government, for want of notice or any other reason beyond its 
control, does not have a fair opportunity to fully counter the defendant’s evidence 
and the government’s theory does not carry the day, the district court is entitled to 
permit further record development on remand.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
                                                 
† The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a), and 
2255(d). 
 7 
 
 Here, it is clear that at the initial sentencing proceeding, the government 
neither knew that Vazquez’s Accusation conviction was a simple possession 
offense nor that Vazquez had violated his probation on the 364 conviction.  In the 
absence of notice that the Accusation conviction could not serve as a predicate 
offense for the career offender enhancement, the government had no opportunity to 
prove that there was another basis for applying the enhancement.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
deciding that the government should be permitted to introduce new evidence if the 
case were remanded for resentencing.  See Dickler, 64 F.3d at 832. 
 Accordingly, we turn to whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
Vazquez could not demonstrate the prejudice required to succeed on his 
ineffectiveness prong.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
“The legal component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . is subject to 
plenary review.”  Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1998).  In 
United States v. Mannino, we considered a § 2255 habeas petitioner’s 
ineffectiveness claim that was based on counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal a 
sentencing guidelines issue.  212 F.3d 835, 839 (3d Cir. 2000).  In considering the 
prejudice prong, we declared that the “test for prejudice under Strickland is not 
whether petitioners would likely prevail upon remand, but whether we would have 
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likely reversed and ordered a remand had the issue been raised on direct appeal.”  
Id. at 844.  
 We apply the test set out in Mannino.  Because it is undisputed in this case 
that the PSR was wrong in concluding that the Accusation conviction qualified as a 
predicate offense for purposes of the career offender enhancement, and because the 
career offender enhancement subjected Vazquez to a higher sentencing guideline 
range, Vazquez has demonstrated a likelihood that we would have vacated the 
sentence and remanded for resentencing if the error had been raised on direct 
appeal.  Indeed, in Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1978), we 
declared that it is “clear, [that] when the information included in a presentence 
report, on which a sentence is founded at least in part, is unreliable, due process 
requires that a defendant be resentenced.”  Id. at 183; see also Townsend v. Burke, 
334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (declaring that when a prisoner is sentenced based on 
assumptions about his criminal history which are “materially untrue[, s]uch a 
result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process 
of law, and such a conviction cannot stand”).  Although it is possible that Vazquez 
might receive the same sentence should he ultimately prevail, he “has an 
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unqualified right to be present at . . . resentencing upon remand.”‡  Mannino, 212 
F.3d at 845.   
 The District Court relied upon Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), as 
authority for its conclusion that Vazquez had not been prejudiced.  In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he had been 
prejudiced by an error that did not render the petitioner’s sentencing “unfair” or 
“unreliable.”  Id. at 371.  The Court explained that “[u]nreliability or unfairness 
does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive [him] of any 
substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.”  Id. at 372.  The 
error in Lockhart was counsel’s failure to raise a legal argument at sentencing.  By 
the time Lockhart’s § 2254 petition was filed, however, the legal basis for 
counsel’s ineffectiveness no longer had merit.  Id.  Unlike Lockhart, the error in 
this case was an incorrect factual averment in the PSR regarding his criminal 
history, which persisted and may have implicated Vazquez’s due process rights.  
See Moore, 571 F.2d at 182-83; Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
determining that Vazquez failed to demonstrate the prejudice required for his 
                                                 
‡ Given the passage of both time and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, it may be 
that Vazquez will receive a shorter sentence. 
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ineffectiveness claim.  We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings.   
 
